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TELEVISED JUSTICE: TOWARD A NEW
DEFINITION OF CONFRONTATION
UNDER MARYLAND V CRAIG
Increased public awareness' of child abuse, indicated by the dramatic rise
in reported cases,2 has brought more children to court. As witnesses in child
sex abuse cases, however, children present special problems. Children may
be psychologically traumatized3 by testifying in court in the presence of the
defendant. It is common for the child to know the abuser, frequently as a
relative or a friend.4 Further, children may be more susceptible to sugges-
tion than adults and tend to have shorter memories than adults.5 These fac-
tors make "it . . . questionable whether children can be effective and
competent witnesses.",
6
Yet despite these problems, the existence of credible child witness testi-
mony remains crucial to the successful prosecution of most child sex abuse
cases: child sex abuse victims are usually the only direct witnesses to their
abuse and most states do not require the testimony of the child to be corrob-
orated.7 Often there is no medical or physical evidence that sexual abuse
occurred.' Thus, in a very real sense it is often the victim's word against the
accused. 9
1. One commentator characterized this awareness as "bordering on hysteria." Michael
H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 20 (1985).
2. See Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An
Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 809 n.1 (1987) (citing Glenn Collins, Studies Find
Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1982, at Cl, col. 1 (noting a
"200% increase in reported sexual offenses against children since 1976")).
3. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative In-
novations, 98 HAPV. L. REV. 806, 818 (1985) ("[O]nly a rare child could fail to be traumatized
by the experience of testifying in court.").
4. Hill & Hill, supra note 2, at 809 n. 1 (citing MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children,
THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 81,'86 (1978)).
5. Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, The Rules of Evidence, and the
Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 231
(1988).
6. Lucy Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 167, 169 (1985).
7. Feher, supra note 5.
8. Berliner, supra note 6, at 171.
9. Feher, supra note 5, at 243. Feher notes that "traditional, aggressive methods of
cross-examination will not work" to test the child's testimony "because such tactics will pro-
mote sympathy for the child and ire at the defense." Id. at 244.
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In response to this dilemma, many states have adopted statutory measures
to ease the trauma experienced by child victims in court.0 ° In addition,
some courts make special provisions for child witnesses, such as allowing
leading questions in direct testimony11 and barring spectators and the press
from the courtroom during the child's testimony. 12
A majority of states have enacted statutes that are aimed primarily at pro-
tecting child sex abuse victims from testifying in open court in the presence
of the accused.' 3 These statutes fall into two broad categories. Some facili-
tate the admission of a child's out-of-court statements as substantive evi-
dence.14 Others allow child sex abuse victims to testify via an alternative
means, either by closed circuit television during trial 5 or by a prior video-
10. See Josephine Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child Sexual
Abuse: Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40 U. MIAMI L.REV. 5, 6-8 (1985); Eleanor L. Owen,
Recent Development, The Confrontation Clause Applied to Minor Victims of Sexual Abuse, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1512-14 (1989).
11. Berliner, supra note 6, at 171.
12. Id. at 172.
13. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 (1990).
14. These hearsay statutes are beyond the scope of this note.
15. Twenty-four states have laws that allow the use of one-way closed circuit television (in
which the child cannot see the defendant). See ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 12.42.046 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55 (Michie Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A-3 (1987); IND. CODE § 35-
37-4-8 (1988); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-350(1), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283
(West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1988); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-32.4 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 753(B) (Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982,
5985 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071, § 3 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH RULE CRIM. PROC. 15.5 (1990); VT. RULE EvID. 807(d)
(Supp. 1990).
Eight states authorize the use of two-way closed circuit television (in which the child can see
the defendant on a television monitor). See CAL. PENAL CODE. § 1347 (West Supp. 1990);
HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (Supp. 1989);
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4)(c)(2) (1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.41(C), (E) (Baldwin 1986); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988); VT. RULE EVID. 807(e) (Supp. 1990).
Thirty-seven states allow child sex abuse victims to testify via videotape. See ALA. CODE
§ 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, -4253(B), (C) (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
ch. 626, Rule Evid. 616 (1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 106A-2 (1989); IND. CODE
§§ 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f, (g) (1988); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1558 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(5) (West
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taped deposition which is presented to the jury at the time of trial. 6
Although the defendant's attorney must be present to cross-examine the wit-
ness and must be in communication with the defendant during cross-exami-
nation, the defendant is not physically present during the testimony.1 7 The
goal of these statutes is to foster more accurate and truthful testimony by
shielding the testifying child from the trauma of facing the defendant in an
open courtroom. 1 8 These new statutes, designed literally to hide the defend-
ants from their alleged victims, are in conflict with the defendants' right to
confront their accusers in open court, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause.' 9
Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1989);
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 491.675-.690 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401-403 (1989); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-1926 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 517:13-a (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Michie 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2907.41(A), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 753(C) (Supp. 1988); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-116(d), (e), () (Supp. 1989);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH RULE CRIM. PROC.
15.5 (1990); VT. RULE EVID. 807(d) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 967.04(7)-(10) (West
Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987); Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167-68.
16. The Supreme Court has ruled that broadcasting testimony over closed circuit televi-
sion is not "out-of-court," hence, not hearsay. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. While presenting
videotaped testimony rather than a live broadcast over closed circuit television might more
logically be classified as hearsay, most state courts consider a videotaped deposition that mir-
rors trial proceedings to be the functional equivalent of live testimony. See, e.g., State v.
Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374, 391-92, 442 N.W.2d 10, 12-19 (stating videotaped testimony is the
"functional equivalent to live in-court testimony"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 188 (1989); State v.
Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 697, 529 A.2d 1245, 1252 (1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061
(1988). But see State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 329, 729 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1986)
("[V]ideotaped testimony is hearsay."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1071 (1987). For purposes of
this Note, statutes that create provisions for closed circuit television broadcasts will not be
distinguished from those which allow videotaped depositions, unless there is a substantial rea-
son to do so.
17. Wallace J. Mlyniec & Michelle M. Daily, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual
Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?,
40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115, 125 (1985).
18. See Ellen Forman, Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 437, 437-38 (1989). The group of statutes in the second category will be re-
ferred to as "child shield" laws and the testimony given under such statutes as "televised
testimony." There is a third group of statutes which allows the use of an ex parte videotape
statement on the condition that the child is later available in court and subject to cross-exami-
nation. These videotape statements, however, are more logically viewed as a form of hearsay
and are beyond the scope of this Note.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. "
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The United States Supreme Court decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court20 is a leading case legitimizing the concept that children in-
volved in sex abuse prosecutions may be entitled to special protection. Globe
permitted trial courts to close criminal trials to the press and the public if the
court makes a particularized finding that closing the courtroom is "neces-
sary to protect the welfare" of the child.21 The Globe Court found that the
state's interest in protecting " 'minor victims of certain sex crimes from pub-
lic degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psychological damage' ,,22
is a compelling one. While Globe remedies one source of trauma-the pros-
pect of speaking about such intimate matters in open court-it does not as-
suage the trauma of face-to-face confrontation with the accused. 23  But
neither does the Globe ruling infringe upon the right to face-to-face
confrontation.24
The use by states of the now popular child shield laws represents an in-
fringement of a defendant's right to confront his accusers at trial. In imple-
menting these statutes, courts must balance this long-standing right against
the avowed need to protect children and bring wrongdoers to justice.25
While there is purportedly unanimous concern for the child, at issue is the
extent to which the court may deprive criminal defendants of the right to
face their accusers at trial.26
In Maryland v. Craig,27 the Supreme Court endorsed a procedure that
struck the balance in favor of protecting the child in child sex abuse cases.
Craig creates an exception to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
This exception establishes a class of witnesses-child sex abuse victims-
20. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
21. Id. at 608.
22. Id. at 607 n. 18 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 383 Mass. 838, 848,
423 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1981)).
23. See Note, supra note 3, at 813, 826.
24. Arguably, Globe may impinge on another Sixth Amendment right, the right to a pub-
lic trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .. " Id.
25. See, e.g, State v. Andrews, 447 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Iowa 1989) (holding a child's
unresponsive testimony at trial, absent showing that unresponsiveness was caused by fear of
defendant, did not in itself justify use of prior videotaped testimony); Commonwealth v. Berg-
strom, 402 Mass. 534, 544-46, 524 N.E.2d 366, 373 (1988) (ruling that unless a child victim is
unavailable, use of televised testimony is an unjustified infringement on the defendant's right to
physical confrontation); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 431, 484 A.2d 1330, 1342
(1984) (stating considerations of trauma to child "must be weighed and balanced against the
right of confrontation in child abuse cases"). But see State v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240, 242
(Iowa) (finding evidence that child had been the victim of "horrendous and painful abuse by
someone" justified dispensing with defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 212 (1989).
26. See generally Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 17.
27. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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who may testify at trial while avoiding face-to-face confrontation with their
alleged abusers. 28 The Craig exception allows the child victim to give tele-
vised testimony outside the presence of the defendant if the trial court deter-
mines that confronting the defendant would so traumatize the child that he
could not "reasonably communicate."
29
Sandra Ann Craig, a day care provider, was convicted by a Maryland
court of sexually abusing children enrolled in her pre-school."a Prior to
trial, the prosecution requested a statutory procedure allowing the use of
one-way closed circuit television for the presentation of the testimony of
child sex abuse victims.31 In a pre-trial hearing, expert witnesses testified
that the children would have difficulty testifying in the presence of the ac-
cused.32 Based on the testimony of the experts, the trial court determined,
as required by statute, that testifying in the presence of the defendant would
cause the child witnesses such emotional distress that the children could not
reasonably communicate.33 A jury convicted Craig, and the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals affirmed.34 The Maryland Court of Appeals re-
versed, concluding that the state's evidence of need was insufficient to war-
rant denial of the defendant's confrontation right. 35 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately vacated the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals.
36
In the majority's opinion, a state may use a special procedure designed to
shield children from viewing their alleged abusers at trial if necessary to
prevent trauma to the child and to ensure the accuracy of the child's testi-
mony. 37 Thus, Maryland's statutory provisions, which allowed the use of
the special procedure only when the court found that testifying in the pres-
28. Id. at 3169.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3160.
31. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1) (1989) provides:
(a)(l) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article or
Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child victim
be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of closed
circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will
result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate.
32. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
33. Id. at 3162.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3162, 3171.
37. Id. at 3169.
19911
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ence of the defendant would render a child unable to communicate reason-
ably, passed constitutional muster.a8
The dissent, led by Justice Scalia, protested vigorously. Justice Scalia ar-
gued that such an infringement of the confrontation right is "explicitly for-
bidden" by the Constitution.39 Justice Scalia further argued that, generally,
exceptions to the hearsay rule hinge on a finding that the witness is unavaila-
ble at trial.' The majority's ruling, he asserted, would allow a child to be
excused from testifying in the presence of the defendant simply because the
child was "unwilling" to testify in this manner, an unprecedented result.41
This Note surveys state laws and judicial decisions permitting victims of
child abuse to testify via closed circuit television or videotaped depositions in
lieu of live testimony and analyzes the impact of Maryland v. Craig on these
laws. This Note then discusses the United States Supreme Court's rationale
in Craig for creating this new exception to the Confrontation Clause and the
effect it may have on the rights of criminal defendants. This Note will con-
clude that this exception to the Confrontation Clause is a creature of public
policy which may overreach its limited purpose of protecting children from
trauma. Finally, this Note argues that Craig leaves unanswered many im-
portant questions about the level of evidence needed to invoke this exception
and the characteristics of the class entitled to its protection.
I. CHILD SHIELD LAWS IN THE STATES AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: BEFORE COY V. IOWA
A. Confrontation Clause
The central purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to require an adverse
witness physically to confront the accused in a criminal trial with the evi-
dence against him.42 The Confrontation Clause also provides parties with
38. Id. at 3170.
39. Id. at 3174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), described the importance of physical
confrontation, as well as cross-examination, to the confrontation right:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an op-
portunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the wit-
ness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief
Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).
Later, the Supreme Court underscored the dual purpose of the Confrontation Clause. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (finding "[t]he Confrontation Clause pro-
[Vol. 40:967
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the opportunity to elicit testimony under oath, to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, and enables the jury to observe and test the credibility of the wit-
ness.4 3 The Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause requires
that adverse witnesses appear at trial to be examined by the prosecution in
the presence of the accused and to face the defendant for cross-examina-
tion." This right is not "absolute,"4 5 but there is a "preference for face-to-
face confrontation at trial,"" which "must occasionally give way to consid-
erations of public policy and the necessities of the case." '47 Thus, the courts
have created a number of exceptions to the right to confrontation.4" The
exceptions mainly allow into evidence out-of-court statements or hearsay, in
which there is no possibility of in-court confrontation.4 9
In Ohio v. Roberts,5° the Court established a two-prong test for determin-
ing exceptions to the confrontation right. In Roberts, a witness testified at a
preliminary hearing against a defendant accused of check forgery and pos-
session of stolen credit cards; the witness subsequently disappeared and
could not be located at the time of trial.5 Following the prosecution's good
faith effort to locate the witness,52 the trial court allowed the use of the pre-
liminary hearing transcripts and the defendant was convicted.5 3 The Ohio
vides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who
testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination").
43. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1970); see Owen, supra note 10, at 1516-17.
44. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). The court did not
permit the use of videotaped testimony of an adult woman, stating that "[n]ormally the right
of confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting at trial at which time cross-examination takes
place." See also Graham, supra note 1, at 66.
45. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990).
46. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
47. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
48. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (present sense impression); FED. R. EViD. 803(2) (ex-
cited utterance); FED. R. EvID. 803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condi-
tion). These traditional hearsay exceptions do not require that the declarant be unavailable to
testify. Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 527-28 (1988).
Other hearsay exceptions, such as FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony), require that
the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial. See also Graham, supra, at 549.
49. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (state-
ment under belief of impending death); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) (statements against interest);
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(4) (statement of personal or family history). The scope of the Confron-
tation Clause, however, is broader than hearsay. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970); see also Graham, supra note 48, at 524 (noting the Supreme Court "has... stated that
the confrontation clause is not a codification of the hearsay rule").
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
51. Id. at 58-59.
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 60.
1991]
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Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.54 Fol-
lowing a grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
the trial court correctly allowed the use of the hearing transcript.55  The
Court stated that two elements are necessary to satisfy the exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause. First, the proponent of the evidence must establish
the unavailability of the declarant. 6 Second, the evidence must have "ade-
quate indicia of reliability."' 57 If the evidence fits a "firmly rooted" excep-
tion,58 the court can infer reliability.59 "[P]articularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" must be established for all other exceptions.' In this case,
the Court found that the prosecution had earnestly tried and failed to locate
the witness, and had demonstrated that she was unavailable to testify.6 '
Further, the Court stated that the testimony was reliable because the defense
attorney had cross-examined the absent witness at the hearing.62
The Roberts standard has been adopted by a few states as an appropriate
framework for balancing the need to protect children against the confronta-
tion rights of criminal defendants.63 Unfortunately, many states have
adopted a lesser standard and a few have presumed that the harm to the
child in confronting the accused automatically outweighs any damage to the
confrontation rights of the accused. 64
54. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the State failed to meet
its burden of demonstrating that it attempted to locate the witness. The Supreme Court of
Ohio affirmed, however, because "the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary
hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial." Id. at 61.
55. Id. at 77.
56. "In the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Id. at 65.
In child abuse prosecutions, "unavailability" may include "incompetence, ... the danger of
severe psychological injury to a child victim from testifying, and an unwillingness or inability
to testify." Graham, supra note 48, at 554.
57. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
58. Id. An example of a "firmly rooted exception" is a "dying declaration." Dying decla-
rations "are considered trustworthy" against the accused in a homicide case. Glen Weis-
senberger, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY
AND AUTHORITY § 804.17 (1987).
59. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
60. Id. For example, in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Supreme
Court found that the exception for co-conspirator's statements was firmly rooted "enough" so
that the Court did not have to make an independent evaluation of the statement's reliability.
Id. at 183.
61. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 75. "The law does not require the doing of a futile act." Id. at
74.
62. Id. at 70-71.
63. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987); infra notes 115-24
and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., State v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240, 241-42 (Iowa) (upholding use of one-
way mirror because protecting delicate emotional condition of child witness is an important
[Vol. 40:967
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Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court65 offered support for the idea that
child sex abuse victims deserve special treatment at trial and that the needs
of children can sometimes justify the infringement of a constitutional right.
In Globe, the United States Supreme Court ruled that trial courts may close
trials to the press and the public if the court makes a particularized finding
that this is necessary to protect the child-an act which necessarily limits
the news media's exercise of their First Amendment rights.66
B. The Presumption of Harm to the Child
The test created in Ohio v. Roberts provided some guidance for determin-
ing the validity of Confrontation Clause exceptions. Nonetheless, some states
attempting to shield children from their alleged abusers have cast aside the
Roberts framework, creating standards that allow the use of televised testi-
mony. These standards presume that the needs of child sex abuse victims
always outweigh the rights of the defendant.
The states adopting this "presumptive" view allow the blanket admission
of televised testimony taken outside the presence of the defendant if the wit-
ness testifying is a child sex abuse victim below a statutory minimum age. 67
State supreme courts have upheld such laws based upon the presumption
that all young children, regardless of their individual circumstances and
characteristics, need protection from the trauma of testifying in court.6 8 For
example, in State v. Cooper,69 the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted
the legislative presumption in the state's shield statute that all young chil-
dren needed such protection and concluded that the face-to-face requirement
of the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied by cross-examination outside
the defendant's presence.7 °
public policy), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 212 (1989); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 356, 353
S.E.2d 451, 454 (1987) (upholding use of videotaped testimony of three-year-old child because
child sex abuse victims need special consideration).
65. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
66. Id. at 607-09.
67. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1989) (allowing the child abuse victim to testify
through closed circuit television at the discretion of the trial judge); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (allowing the use of television cameras to pres-
ent the testimony of a child abuse victim under the age of 12 at the discretion of the trial
judge).
68. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984). In Sheppard,
the court allowed the use of video equipment in the prosecution of a man for sexually abusing
his ten-year-old stepdaughter. The court was concerned with the possibility of further harm
inflicted on child witnesses by the judicial process and reasoned that "[c]hildren who are pre-
vailed upon to testify may be more damaged by their traumatic role in the court proceedings
than they were by their abuse." Id. at 431, 484 A.2d at 1342.
69. 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
70. Id. at 356, 353 S.E.2d at 454.
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Other courts base their tests on the presumption that the trauma induced
by facing the defendant in the courtroom undermines a child's truthfulness,
a result which justifies dispensing with face-to-face encounters.7 ' Courts
have also presumed that the very nature of sexual abuse indicates truthful-
ness in child testimony, for it is inconceivable that small children could
fabricate the particulars of an assault.72 The Kansas Supreme Court ex-
pressed the presumption in favor of a child's veracity in State v. Myatt.
73
Myatt involved the interpretation of a statute creating a hearsay exception
for child sex abuse victims. 74 In Myatt, a six-year-old girl was diagnosed
with gonorrhea. 7 She told a social worker and a police officer that her
mother's boyfriend had touched her in the genital area.76 The trial court
allowed the social worker and the police officer to testify about the child's
statements. Partially on the basis of this testimony, the defendant was con-
victed of child molestation. 7 Because children are not likely to lie to their
parents or other authority figures about sexual abuse, the court found a
child's testimony concerning sexual abuse to be inherently reliable.78 More-
over, the court held that children lack the requisite knowledge to fabricate
about such matters.7 9
While the Myatt court addressed the validity of a hearsay exception for
child sex abuse victims, the presumption in favor of a child's truthfulness
applies equally to televised testimony. Under the presumptive view, if the
prosecution wishes to invoke the child shield statute, a criminal defendant in
71. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 243 Kan. 270, 755 P.2d 547, vacated, 488 U.S. 962 (1988).
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the sex abuse conviction of a man accused of sexually
abusing his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Id. at 276, 755 P.2d at 551. Her testimony was given
via one-way closed circuit television pursuant to the Kansas child shield law. Id. at 271, 755
P.2d at 550. The court held that the statute had been "wisely" enacted by the state legislature
as "the best means by which the truth could be ascertained" from children. Id. at 274, 755
P.2d at 550. The court reasoned that while physical confrontation "encourages the truth in an
adult witness .... it is more likely to inspire terror, trauma, and speechlessness in a small
child." Id.
72. The assumption in the 1990s is "that children who allege sexual abuse must be be-
lieved." Feher, supra note 5, at 234. This is a complete reversal of an earlier rule that children
who make such charges should not be believed. Id. While agreeing that children do not "lie,"
some researchers suggest that a child, in striving to please or accommodate adults, may adopt
a story as true that is different from what actually occurred. Id. at 236-38.
73. 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985).
74. Id. at 19, 697 P.2d at 839.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id., 697 P.2d at 840.
78. Id. at 22, 697 P.2d at 840.
79. Id., 697 P.2d at 841.
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a child sex abuse case can never demand the right to confront his accusers.80
The criminal defendant's rights are thus automatically subservient to his al-
leged victim's.
C. The Requirement that Some Harm be Proved
While some courts embraced the presumption that all children need pro-
tection from the trauma of testifying against the accused in open court,81
others determined that the mere presumption of harm is not sufficient to
justify dispensing with the confrontation right.8 2 Instead, some require that
a court determine that testifying in the presence of the defendant will either
harm the child in some way or impede the judicial process. Absent such a
finding, the use of a child shield procedure will not pass constitutional mus-
ter.83 For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in interpreting its law
giving trial judges total discretion to invoke the child shield statute,84 in-
serted a minimal requirement that the use of a child shield law be "reason-
ably necessary" to protect child victims from trauma.85 In Commonwealth
v. Willis, 6 the court upheld the use of television cameras to present the testi-
80. Cf State v. Vess, 157 Ariz. 236, 238, 756 P.2d 333, 335 (1988) (rejecting explicitly the
notion that a child sex abuse victim should always be able to present televised testimony).
81. See State v. Chisholm, 243 Kan. 270, 755 P.2d 547, vacated, 488 U.S. 962 (1988);
State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
82. Graham, supra note 48, at 559-60.
83. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 229 N.J. Super. 66, 74, 550 A.2d 1241, 1245 (1988) (requiring
finding that the "witness would suffer severe emotional or mental distress"); Glendening v.
State, 536 So. 2d 212, 218 (Fla. 1988) (requiring finding that the child would suffer "emotional
or. mental harm"), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 254,
551 N.E.2d 561, 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (1990) (requiring the court to find that "child
witness will suffer severe mental or emotional harm" (emphasis in original)).
84. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1991) (declared un-
constitutional on other grounds by Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987)).
The statute at the time of trial read as follows:
The court may, on the motion of the attorney for any party, order that the testimony
of the child be taken in a room other than the courtroom and be televised by closed
circuit equipment in the courtroom to be viewed by the court and the finder of fact in
the proceeding.
Id. at § 421.350(3).
85. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230-31 (Ky. 1986). Unlike the United
States Constitution, the Kentucky State Constitution contains an explicit "face-to-face" re-
quirement. Id. The trial court reasoned, however, that "[tlhe choice of the words 'face to face'
may have resulted from an inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-
examination and confrontation without physical presence," i.e., television. Id. at 230. The
dissent protested angrily that "[t]he majority has put the imprimatur of this Court on a new
revision of the rule which says that the right of confrontation is no longer 'face to face,' but is
rather, 'face-to television screen-to face'." Id. at 234.
86. 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
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mony of a five-year-old child abuse victim. 87 The court determined that the
child's reluctance to testify in the presence of the accused and her failure to
give specifics about the crime while in the defendant's presence justified use
of the protective procedure and met the "reasonably necessary" standard 88
The Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend
the traditional requirement of unavailability to be imposed on child sex
abuse victims, otherwise it would not have provided this special statutory
89protection.
Courts adopting the Willis view recognize the need to balance the desire to
protect children from harm against the possible harm to the defendant's
right to confrontation.' But the competing interests are not equally
weighted. For example, in the Willis court's view, the needs of the child are
real and compelling, while the violation of the defendant's right is a mere
technicality.91
D. The Requirement of Particularized Need
Other courts have required a stronger showing of particularized need
before dispensing with the confrontation right.92 These courts have upheld
child shield statutes only if the statute required a case by case evaluation of
the needs of a particular child. 93
For example, in State v. Vess,94 because there was no requirement of an
individualized showing that the child needed to be protected, the Arizona
Supreme Court held as unconstitutional an Arizona statute" allowing the
use of televised testimony at the discretion of the trial judge.96 The defend-
ant in Vess was convicted of child molesting, sexual abuse, and furnishing
obscene materials to a minor based on the victim's videotaped testimony
87. Id. at 231.
88. Id. at 230.
89. Id. The court concluded that construing the statute to require a showing of unavaila-
bility "would provide no further protection for child witnesses than was already available."
Id. The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to do a "vain act." Id.
90. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
91. Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 230-31.
92. Supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., State v. Vess, 157 Ariz. 236, 756 P.2d 333 (1988); State v. Jarzbek, 204
Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); State v. Twist, 528 A.2d
1250 (Me. 1987).
94. 157 Ariz. 236, 756 P.2d 333 (1988).
95. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989). The statute provides: "The court, on
motion of the prosecution, may order that the testimony of the minor be taken in a room other
than the courtroom and be televised by closed circuit equipment in the courtroom to be viewed
by the court and the finder of fact in the proceeding." Id.
96. Vess, 157 Ariz. at 238, 756 P.2d at 335.
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taken in conformance with the state's child shield statute.9 While the court
indicated that such testimony may be constitutional if there is a showing that
a particular child would be either traumatized or unable to communicate in
the presence of the defendant,98 the court refused to sanction the creation of
a class of witnesses who need not testify before the jury if the prosecutor
does not want them to, regardless of whether the prosecution has demon-
strated a need for such a procedure.99
On the other hand, statutes requiring the court to find that a particular
child needs to present televised testimony can result in the court sustaining
the statute. In State v. Twist,"c° the Maine Supreme Court upheld the state's
child shield statute,'' which set a standard requiring the court to "expressly
findo that the emotional or psychological well-being of the person would be
substantially impaired if the person were to testify at trial."' 0 2 In Twist, two
child victims presented videotaped testimony 10 3 pursuant to Maine's child
shield statute,"° which resulted in the conviction of Elwood Twist for rape
and unlawful sexual contact.105 The Maine Supreme Court found that the
statutory standard justified dispensing with face-to-face confrontation be-
cause it "advanced the important public policy of protecting the emotional
and psychological well-being of young children.""'°
97. Id. at 237-38, 756 P.2d at 333-34.
98. Id. at 238, 756 P.2d at 335.
99. Id. at 237, 756 P.2d at 334.
100. 528 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1987).
101. Id. at 1253 & n.4 (quoting 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp.
1984)). Unlike the majority of state statutes, the Maine law classified videotaped testimony as
hearsay. Id. In 1985, the Maine legislature repealed and replaced subsections 1 and 2 quoted
below; however, at the time of trial, the statute read as follows:
A hearsay statement made by a person under the age of 14 years, describing any
incident involving sexual intercourse, a sexual act or sexual contact... shall not be
excluded as evidence in criminal proceedings in courts of this State if:
1. Emotional or psychological well-being of a person. On motion of the prosecu-
tion and in camera hearing, the court expressly finds that the emotional or psycho-
logical well-being of the person would be substantially impaired if the person were to
testify at trial; and
2. Examination and cross-examination.... the statement is made under oath, the
defendant has been given the same rights in regard to the examination and cross-
examination of the person as if the person were testifying in open court, and the
statement has been recorded stenographically or on videotape or by another means
approved by the court.
Id.
102. Id at 1253 n.4.
103. Id. at 1251.
104. 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West 1964 & Supp. 1984).
105. Twist, 528 A.2d at 1251.
106. Id. at 1256.
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Using a more restrictive analysis than the Twist court, the Connecticut
Supreme Court, in State v. Jarzbek,0 7 upheld the state's statute providing
that a child sex abuse victim under the age of twelve may be permitted to
present videotaped testimony.' 08 The court, however, rejected a "per se
rule" that "protecting the well-being of children" alone justifies infringement
of a defendant's confrontation rights."0 The defendant in Jarzbek was con-
victed of sexually abusing his five-year-old daughter." 0 Her testimony was
videotaped following a pre-trial hearing in which the state presented testi-
mony of two clinical psychologists who testified that the child would be trau-
matized if called upon to testify in the presence of the defendant."' The
court concluded that the state had failed to justify the use of televised testi-
mony.' 12 Absent a compelling need, the defendant's right to "eyeball-to-
eyeball" confrontation cannot be eliminated.' The court mandated a case-
by-case analysis, 1 4 whereby the state would be required to establish a com-
pelling need to allow the child witness to testify outside the presence of the
defendant." 5 This compelling need could be established if the trial court
determines that physical confrontation would make a child less likely to tes-
tify truthfully, thus undermining the truth-enhancing function of the Con-
frontation Clause. 16
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Wildermuth v. State,
1
'
struck down the conviction of a man accused of sexually abusing his nine-
year-old daughter because she testified via closed circuit television."' The
court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the child would
suffer such emotional harm that she would be unable to reasonably commu-
nicate. "' Maryland's child shield statute explicitly requires that the trial
107. 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 702-03, 529 A.2d at 1254. The court rejected the generalization that "children
are uniquely vulnerable witnesses who must be treated more delicately than adult witnesses in
order to protect their psychological and emotional well-being." Id.
110. Id. at 685-87, 529 A.2d at 1245-47.
111. Id. at 685, 529 A.2d at 1246.
112. Id. at 694, 529 A.2d at 1250.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 704, 529 A.2d at 1255.
115. Id.
116. Id. The court's analysis focused on the truth-enhancing properties of physical con-
frontation. "[P]hysical confrontation contributes significantly, albeit intangibly, to the truth-
seeking process." Id. at 695, 529 A.2d at 1251. The court was also concerned about the effect
of the televised procedures on the "defendant's dignity and the presumption that he is innocent
until proven guilty." Id.
117. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
118. Id. at 502-04, 530 A.2d at 278-80.
119. Id. at 523-25, 530 A.2d at 288-89.
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court make such a finding. 120 In overturning the conviction, the Wilder-
muth court adopted the traditional standards of admissibility laid down in
Ohio v. Roberts.12' The court held that both the necessity of admitting the
evidence and the reliability of the testimony were applicable to child testi-
mony. 122 The court concluded that "cross-examination, testimony under
oath, ability of judge, jury, and accused to view the witness during the testi-
mony," even if only through a television screen, satisfied the reliability re-
quirement. 123 The court further held that a finding that the child cannot
reasonably communicate "is tantamount to a finding of unavailability in the
Roberts sense, and meets the necessity prong."'124 Unavailability cannot be
established by "mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to tes-
tify" in the particular child involved,' 25 but by an inability to "reasonably
communicate" at trial.'
26
Under the Wildermuth and Jarzbek holdings, the right to physical con-
frontation has significantly greater weight when measured against the need
to protect child sex abuse victims from trauma. 27 Televised testimony can
only be used when it is justified by the possibility that significant harm to the
particular child involved will undermine the judicial process. 128
E. The Right to Confrontation is Nearly Absolute
A handful of states do not permit the use of videotaped testimony if the
child witness cannot see and be seen by the defendant. This requirement
defeats the purpose of the child shield procedures discussed above. 129 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, for example, struck down a provision of the
Massachusetts child shield statute that allowed the taking of testimony by
120. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
122. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 514-15, 530 A.2d at 284-85.
123. Id. at 515, 530 A.2d at 285.
124. Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286.
125. Id. at 524, 530 A.2d at 289. Embedded even in this more rigorous approach is a
presumed need to protect child victims from courtroom trauma: "to force a child to give this
sort of testimony, in open court, in the presence of the accused, may further traumatize the
child." Id. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285.
126. Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286.
127. Supra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 704-05, 529 A.2d 1245, 1255 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 518, 530 A.2d at 286 (holding that
"(unavailability) must be specific to the particular witness").
129. This process protects the child from the trauma of testifying in open court, but not
from the trauma invoked by the presence of the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berg-
strom, 402 Mass. 534, 552-53, 524 N.E.2d 366, 377-78 (1988) (striking portions of MAss. GEN.
L. ch. 278, § 16D, allowing the taking of televised testimony outside the presence of the
defendant).
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videotape or closed-circuit television outside the presence of the defend-
ant. 130 The Massachusetts statute allowed taping outside the presence of the
defendant if the court found by a preponderance of evidence that facing the
defendant in court would cause the child victim psychological or emotional
trauma. 13 1 In Commonwealth v. Bergstrom,'32 the Massachusetts court held
that this provision of the statute, on its face, violated the state constitution's
explicit right to face-to-face confrontation. 33  As a result, the court over-
turned the conviction of a father for sexually abusing his two young daugh-
ters. The court also emphasized the importance of physical confrontation
under the Federal Constitution.' 34 The court argued that a witness's verac-
ity is tested not only by cross-examination, but by meeting the defendant
face-to-face at trial. 135 The court found that the exception for child sex
abuse victims was both too broad and "crime specific"'136 because "no princi-
pled distinction can be drawn between a child witness and any other class
whom the Legislature might in the future deem in need of special treat-
ment."' 137 Although the court found concerns about the difficulties an indi-
vidual child may encounter in open court to be valid, it was not willing to
dispense with face-to-face confrontation on that ground. 13' The court held
that "[tihe right of the accused to be tried in the manner which our Consti-
tution guarantees cannot dissolve under the pressures of changing social cir-
cumstance or societal focus."1 39 While the court did not reject outright the
use of videotaped testimony where it was necessary to "avoid severe and
long lasting emotional trauma to the child,"' 14 the court held that to satisfy
130. Id. at 552-54, 524 N.E.2d at 377-78.
131. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. 1991). Alternative procedures may
be used provided "the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence... that the child witness
is likely to suffer psychological or emotional trauma as a result of testifying in open court,
[and] as a result of testifying in the presence of the defendant." Id.
132. 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988).
133. Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution states that "every subject shall have a
right to produce all proofs, that may be favorable to him; [and] to meet the witnesses against
him face to face.. . ." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (emphasis added). The Bergstrom court
reasoned that "constitutional language more definitively guaranteeing the right to a direct con-
frontation between witness and accused is difficult to imagine." Bergstrom, 402 Mass. at 541-
42, 524 N.E.2d at 371.
134. Id. at 542, 524 N.E.2d at 372.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 546-47, 524 N.E.2d at 374. "The recognized exceptions to the right of direct
confrontation ... apply impartially to all situations which the constitutional guarantee gov-
erns." Id. at 546, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
137. Id. at 546-47, 524 N.E.2d at 374.
138. Id. at 552-53, 524 N.E.2d at 377.
139. Id. at 553, 524 N.E.2d at 377.
140. Id. at 550-51, 524 N.E.2d at 376. The court was reluctant to allow the use of taped
testimony under less than compelling circumstances, because televised testimony is not "the
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the Sixth Amendment rights, the defendant must be present and visible to
the witness at the taping of the testimony. 4 '
By 1988, a majority of states had enacted a patchwork of child shield
statutes, which permitted defendants varying degrees of protection from in-
fringement of their confrontation rights. While the state courts were active
in attempting to balance the use of televised testimony in child sex abuse
prosecutions against the right of an accused to face his accuser at trial, the
United States Supreme Court was silent. The Supreme Court attempted to
end the differences between the states in Coy v. Iowa, but simply added to the
confusion by sending a dual message.
II. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: COY V. IOWA
In Coy v. Iowa,'42 the United States Supreme Court addressed directly, for
the first time, the states's use of procedures to shield child abuse victims
from confronting their alleged abusers in the courtroom.' 43 In Coy, the
Court overturned a man's conviction of sexually molesting two thirteen-
year-old girls because Iowa's child shield statute" allowed the girls to tes-
tify with a screen placed between them and the defendant that removed him
from their view. 4 ' With the screen in place, the defendant, judge and jury
could see the witnesses, but the witness could not see the defendant.146
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the screen method of pro-
tection, reasoning that a face-to-face meeting is " 'essential to a fair trial in a
criminal prosecution.' ""'4 Justice Scalia concluded that it would be "diffi-
cult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's
right to a face-to-face encounter" than screening the defendant from his ac-
equivalent of personal observation." Id. at 550, 524 N.E.2d at 376. "Especially where child
witnesses are involved, and great leeway for leading questions is allowed, jurors must be able to
choose their own focus in looking for any direct or indirect influences on a child's testimony."
Id.
141. Id. at 551, 524 N.E.2d at 376.
142. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
143. An earlier case, Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), concerned the right of a
criminal defendant in a child sex abuse case. In Stincer, the Court addressed whether the
defendant had a right to be present during the children's competency hearing. Id. at 732. The
Court ruled that because the children were not asked any substantive questions about the
crime during the competency hearing, and because the defendant "had the opportunity for full
and effective cross-examination of the two witnesses during trial," the defendant's exclusion
from the hearing did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 744. The Court did not
consider the constitutionality of state laws that permit the accusers to testify and avoid physi-
cal confrontation at trial.
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.13 (West Supp. 1991).
145. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1014-15.
146. Id. at 1015.
147. Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
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cusers. 14' According to Justice Scalia, the "legislatively imposed presump-
tion of trauma" in the Iowa statute did not establish the necessity that might
allow an exception to the literal meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 149
In contrast to Justice Scalia's strongly worded opinion, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion suggested that a state law permitting a pro-
cedure that is "necessary to further [sic] an important public policy" and
requiring a "case-specific finding of necessity" might justify an exception to
the Confrontation Clause.
150
Coy invalidated state approaches relying on legislatively-imposed pre-
sumptions of trauma, but it did not automatically render such laws void.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence established a framework for evaluating the
constitutionality of child shield statutes. First, the statutes must further an
important public policy; second, the court must make a case-specific finding
of necessity before permitting the use of a child shield procedure.' 5 '
A. The State Court's Rush to Protect Child Shield Statutes
State courts acted to preserve their child shield laws within the Coy v.
Iowa ' 52 framework. Various state courts found that impaired truthful-
ness,' 53 traumatization or harm to the child,' 54 inability to communicate, or
unavailability' 5 satisfied the Coy requirement of necessity.
148. Id. at 1020.
149. Id. at 1021. Justice Scalia's opinion stressed the fundamental nature of the right to
physical confrontation at trial. Id. at 1016. Pointing to Kentucky v. Stincer, Scalia maintained
that the Court has "never doubted.., that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant
a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id.
150. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Id.
152. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
153. See, e.g., State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082
(1989). The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529
A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988), preceded Coy and required that the trial
court determine that testifying in the presence of the accused would cast serious doubt on the
"trustworthiness and reliability" of the child witness. Bonello, 210 Conn. at 54, 554 A.2d at
279. The Bonello court concluded that Jarzbek standards were consistent with Coy because
"the rationale of promoting the search for truth that underlies Jarzbek is identical to the con-
cerns expressed... in Coy." Id. at 60, 554 A.2d at 282. The court went as far as to argue that
Jarzbek "promote[s] rather than restrict[s] the sixth amendment's fundamental objective of
establishing ... the facts." Id.
154. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 245 Kan. 145, 777 P.2d 753 (1989). The court remanded
to the trial court to make the "necessary individualized findings as to the probability, degree,
and duration of psychological injury to the child" if the child testifies in court in the presence
of the defendant. Id. at 152, 777 P.2d at 759.
155. See, e.g., State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1989). The statute, MINN.
STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4(c) (1988), allows a child witness to give testimony via videotape if the
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In states with "presumptive" statutes, state supreme courts generally up-
held the statutes by engrafting a requirement that the trial court make a
particularized finding of necessity before invoking the statute." 6 For exam-
ple, in State v. Eaton,1" because the trial court allowed the use of closed
circuit television absent a particularized finding of necessity, the Kansas
Supreme Court overturned a child sex abuse conviction.15 The court sus-
tained the state law, however, provided a trial court first finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that testifying in the presence of the defendant ren-
dered the child unable to communicate reasonably or unavailable to
testify. 159
In light of Coy, the more restrictive Connecticut court reevaluated and
reaffirmed its Jarzbek standards,"6° which had earlier imposed a necessity
requirement onto its presumptive state law. State courts also upheld laws
already requiring a particularized finding of necessity, 161 as well as many
pre-Coy decisions conforming to these statutes. 162
court determines that "the presence of the defendant during testimony... would psychologi-
cally traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify." Id.
156. See, e.g., State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989) (overturning the convic-
tion of first degree murder because defendant's six-year-old son and eight-year-old daughter
provided videotaped testimony without individualized findings, but sustaining the state law if
its application is limited to situations where there is an "individualized showing... that face-
to-face testimony would so traumatize a child witness as to prevent the child from reasonably
communicating"). Id. at 432, 768 P.2d at 164.
The Iowa Court itself glossed over the Coy decision and concluded that Coy permitted ex-
ceptions to face-to-face confrontation "when necessary to further an important public policy"
and that "[p]rotection of child witnesses" was just such a policy meriting an exception. State
v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 212
(1989).
157. 244 Kan. 370, 769 P.2d 1157 (1989).
158. Id. at 378, 769 P.2d at 1162-63.
159. Id. at 384-85, 769 P:2d at 1167-68.
160. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 367, 556 A.2d 112, 117, cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 322 (1989); State v. Jarzbek, 210 Conn. 396, 401, 554 A.2d 1094, 1096 (1989); State v.
Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 58, 554 A.2d 277, 281, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989).
162. See, e.g., State v. Murrell, 393 S.E.2d 919, 922 (S.C. 1990) (upholding conviction for
sexual assault of five-year-old because trial judge made "specific findings" of need before deter-
mining that child could provide videotaped testimony); State v. Davis, 229 N.J. Super. 66, 74,
550 A. 2d 1241, 1245 (1988) (upholding conviction for sexually assaulting two boys, aged three
and four, because trial court found that there was a "'substantial likelihood that the witness
would suffer severe emotional or mental distress if required to testify in open court'" before
allowing child victims to testify via closed-circuit television) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1989); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 218 (Fla. 1988) (up-
holding conviction for sexual battery of 3 1/2-year-old daughter because the trial court found
that "use of videotaped testimony [was] necessary to prevent the child from suffering emo-
tional or mental harm"), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989). Cf People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d
249, 254, 551 N.E.2d 561, 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (1990) (overturning conviction for sexu-
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B. Coy Engenders Restrictions on Child Shield Laws in Some States
Responding to Justice Scalia's rejection of the Iowa child shield proce-
dure, several states saw Coy as limiting the instances in which the child
shield statute could be invoked, regardless of whether the trial court makes a
particularized finding of necessity.163 For example, the Maryland Court of
Appeals further narrowed the circumstances enunciated earlier in Wilder-
muth v. State. 6 The court overturned a child care provider's conviction of
sexually abusing her charges in Craig v. State even though the child's
televised testimony had been provided in conformance with the Maryland
child shield statute. 6- The court concluded that an "inquiry which looks
generally to a child's inability to testify in open court [is] ... too broad to
satisfy the necessity requirement" of Coy.' 66 Instead, the court must find
specifically that it is the presence of the defendant that invokes the emo-
tional distress that is preventing the child witness from "reasonably
communicating."1 67
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court voided a portion of its statute as
unconstitutional under Coy. 16s The Louisiana statute allowed a victim of
child sex abuse under the age of fourteen to give testimony by closed circuit
television with the defendant present, but behind a screen, so that the child
could not hear or see the defendant.' 69 The protective procedure could be
used whenever "justice so requires" at the discretion of the trial judge.'70 In
ally assaulting four-year-old girl because trial judge's subjective impressions did not constitute
clear and convincing evidence required by statute that "child witness will suffer severe mental
or emotional harm" if made to testify in presence of defendant) (emphasis removed); State v.
Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 1989) (overturning conviction for sexual abuse of four-
year-old because trial court's findings were insufficient to establish "that the particular wit-
nesses is [sic] or would be psychologically traumatized").
163. See infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
164. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987); see supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
165. 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
166. Id. at 564, 560 A.2d at 1126.
167. Id. at 566, 560 A.2d at 1127. A similar conclusion was reached in State v. Conklin,
444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989). In Conklin, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned a child
sex abuse conviction because the trial court had not determined that it was the presence of the
defendant that traumatized the child before allowing the child to give televised testimony
outside the presence of the defendant. Id. at 274.
168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1990). The statute provides:
A. On its own motion or on the motion of the attorney for any party, a court may
order when justice so requires that the testimony of a child under fourteen years of
age who may have been physically or sexually abused be taken in a room other than
the courtroom and be simultaneously televised by closed circuit television to the
court and jury.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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State v. Murphy,17 1 the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the defendant's
conviction for sexually abusing a four-year-old child because the Louisiana
statute "contain[ed] at best a generalized legislative finding of the desirability
of conferring special protection to child witnesses." '72 Reasoning that the
"non-specific" standard of "'when justice so requires' . . . clearly violates
[the] defendant's constitutional right of confrontation under... Coy," '173 the
court invalidated the portion of the statute that required the child witness to
be kept from seeing or hearing the defendant while giving televised
testimony. 1 74
The Coy decision did not address other differences in state approaches to
the implementation of child shield laws. 17" For example, some states that
enacted child shield laws established age limits for child witnesses beyond
which they are ineligible to invoke the protections of the statute.1 76 These
age limits vary from state to state. 177 In addition, the states have required,
by statute or by judicial interpretation, that certain types of evidence be
presented to establish the requisite need or harm to the child before permit-
171. 542 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1989).
172. Id. at 1376.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Glenn F. Lang, To See or Not to See the Defendant: Expanding the Use of Florida's
Special Procedures for Taking the Testimony of Witnesses, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 321, 340,
434 (1991). Neither the majority nor the concurring opinions effectively guide the states on
how to construct a constitutionally valid child shield statute. Id.
176. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, para. 106A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988).
177. Statutes commonly preclude access to alternative methods of taking testimony after a
child reaches age 12 or 13. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1991) (12 or
younger); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (12 or younger);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988) (12 or younger); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 967.04(7)-(10)
(West Supp. 1989) (under 12). At least one state sets the cut off point at less than ten years
old. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1988). Others states's statutes shield "child" victims as old as 16
or 17. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-32.4 (1990) (under 16); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
13.2 (Supp. 1989) (17 or younger). In one state, South Carolina, the child shield statute can be
invoked on behalf of a broad class of special witnesses, including the very young, the elderly or
disabled persons. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1985). This section of the
South Carolina Code provides that:
VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WHO ARE VERY YOUNG, ELDERLY, WHO
ARE HANDICAPPED OR WHO HAVE SPECIAL NEEDS, HAVE A RIGHT
TO SPECIAL RECOGNITION AND ATTENTION BY ALL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES.
The court shall treat "special" witnesses sensitively, using closed or taped sessions
when appropriate. The solicitor or defense shall notify the court when a victim or
witness deserves special consideration.
19911
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ting the use of the protective procedures.178 State courts analyze the quan-
tum and type of evidence sufficient to support a finding of necessity in
fundamentally different ways. 179 This burden cannot be reconciled from
state to state.180
178. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring that prosecu-
tion show by clear and convincing evidence that impact of testifying in presence of defendant
would be "so substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a witness"); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 3511 (1987) (allowing the videotaping of a child witness under 12 in criminal cases
upon motion of the Attorney General and notice to defendant); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6
(Burns Supp. 1990) (allowing videotaping of a child 14 or under in crimes involving physical
and sexual abuse, kidnapping, rape, and deviant sexual conduct only if the court finds at a
hearing that the child's statements are reliable and that the "substantial likelihood of emo-
tional or mental harm" renders the child unavailable to testify).
179. See G. Russell Nuce, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse: A New Decade for the Protection
of Our Children?, 39 EMORY L.J. 581, 595-96 (1990); Randal C. Shaffer, Comment, Protecting
the Innocent: Confrontation, Coy v. Iowa, and Televised Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 78 Ky. L.J. 803, 811 (1989-90).
180. Shaffer, Comment, supra note 179, at 811-12 ("inconsistencies run rampant on the
issues of the degree of potential trauma necessary and the method of proof required") (foot-
notes omitted).
Convictions have been overturned because a trial judge used a child shield procedure and
relied solely on his own observation or failed to use expert witnesses. See People v. Cintron, 75
N.Y.2d 249, 253, 551 N.E.2d 561, 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (1990). In Cintron, the four-year-
old victim was called as a witness and was unable to testify on the stand in the presence of the
defendant. Based on the trial judge's "'close' observation of the child during her two hours on
the stand," the judge ordered her testimony taken via closed circuit television. Id. at 256-57,
551 N.E.2d at 566, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 73. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, saying that
the determination that a child needs to provide testimony in this manner must "be based on
something more than the disputed subjective impressions of the Trial Judge, no matter how
sincere." Id. at 263, 551 N.E.2d at 570, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 77; see also State v. Crandall, 231
N.J. Super. 124, 555 A.2d 35 (1989), rev'd, 120 N.J. 649, 577 A.2d 483 (1990). In Crandall,
the defense asked for expert psychological testimony, but the judge relied on the mother's
testimony that the victim "'would clam up and say nothing' if she saw [the] defendant" in
ordering the testimony of a seven-year-old child to be taken by closed circuit television. Id. at
128, 555 A.2d at 37. The court held that in New Jersey if the defense requests expert psycho-
logical testimony, it must be given, absent specific reasons, which must be stated on the record.
Id. at 133, 555 A.2d at 39-40. The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at
135, 555 A.2d at 40. After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that expert testimony
was not needed. State v. Crandall, 120 N.J. 649, 663, 577 A.2d 483, 490 (1990).
On the other hand, state courts have struck down convictions, in part because the judge
failed to personally observe the child or because the judge relied mainly on nonexpert opinion
witnesses. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 523, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987) (striking
down conviction because expert testimony presented regarding need for nine-year-old girl to
testify via closed circuit television not specific enough and the judge "never questioned or even
observed the child"); cf State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 370-74, 556 A.2d 112, 119-21
(holding the use of expert testimony not required when father and stepmother, who had ample
opportunity to observe the child witnesses, testified that children would not testify truthfully if
confronted with defendant), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 322 (1989). In one case, a state court
upheld the use of televised testimony as proper based solely on the trial judge's in camera
conversation with the child and her mother. See State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353, 353
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The Coy decision, particularly Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, set
some outer limits on the application of child shield statutes. It did not, how-
ever, address the issues of evidentiary requirements or age limitations. De-
spite the Coy majority's clear disapproval of such laws, state courts acted to
preserve their statutes. Two years after Coy, the Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of the states' responses to Coy in Maryland v. Craig.
Although Craig refined the constitutional limits of child shield statutes
under Coy, it left many of the same questions unanswered.18 1
III. MARYLAND V CRAIG SIMULTANEOUSLY LIMITS THE USE OF CHILD
SHIELD PROCEDURES AND CREATES A NEW CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE EXCEPTION
A. The Majority View
Justice O'Connor, the author of the concurring opinion in Coy v. Iowa,'
82
wrote the majority opinion in Maryland v. Craig.'83 Craig involved the
Maryland child shield statute.184 The Maryland statute allows the use of
one-way closed circuit television to take the testimony of a child sex abuse
victim, if the trial judge "determines that testimony by the child victim in
the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate."' 85 Under the statute,
the defendant, along with the judge and jury, are present in the court-
room. ' 6 The child gives testimony via closed circuit television from a sepa-
rate room and in the presence of the attorneys for both the defense and the
state.' 87 The child cannot see or hear the defendant but is subject to full
cross-examination by the defendant's attorney. 8 8 In apparent conformance
with the Maryland statute, before invoking the procedure, the trial court
heard evidence from expert witnesses that the child victim "would suffer
'serious emotional distress such that [[he] could not] reasonably communi-
cate,' if required to testify in the courtroom."1 89
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, struck a balance in favor of
protecting the child witness and against the right of physical confrontation.
S.E.2d 451, 452 (1987) (upholding televised testimony when the victim, a three-year-old, told
the trial judge that she was afraid of the defendant).
181. See Lang, supra note 175, at 321.
182. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
183. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
184. MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(l)(ii) (1989).
185. Id.
186. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3161.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting MD. CM. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (a)(l)(ii)).
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She refined the framework established by her concurring opinion in Coy."9
The Coy majority opinion had stated that " 'the Confrontation Clause guar-
antees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before
the trier of fact.' "91 Justice O'Connor in Craig stressed that this right is
not absolute,' 92 but could be infringed when the court found it necessary to
further an important public policy.' 93 Justice O'Connor concluded that pro-
tecting the child sex abuse victims from physical and psychological harm is
an important public policy that can outweigh a defendant's right to a face-
to-face encounter. 194
Justice O'Connor found that in certain circumstances, non face-to-face
confrontation is sufficiently reliable to serve the traditional function of the
Sixth Amendment's confrontation right. Justice O'Connor argued that
physical confrontation is but one aspect of the confrontation right.'95 The
other elements include testimony under oath, cross-examination of the wit-
ness by defendant's counsel, and providing the judge or jury the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witness.196 All these elements together, ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, serve the purpose of "ensuring that evidence
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to ... rigorous adver-
sarial testing .. "197
Justice O'Connor indicated that the absence of face-to-face encounter does
not, in itself, defeat the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. While Justice
O'Connor recognized that the physical aspects of the confrontation right
have "symbolic"' 98 as well as practical value for testing the truth, she ar-
gued that physical confrontation in the courtroom is "not the sine qua non
of the confrontation right.' 9 9 Justice O'Connor supported this contention
by citing the numerous hearsay exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.2"
She argued that the exceptions to the right to confrontation indicate that
no component of that right, including the face-to-face component, is abso-
lute.2"' She found that the reliability prong of Ohio v. Roberts is satisfied if
190. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988).
191. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016).
192. Id. at 3163.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 3167.
195. Id. at 3163-64.
196. Id. at 3163.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 3164.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 3164-65. Justice O'Connor, however, explicitly declined to hold that televised
testimony is hearsay. Id. at 3167. "[T]he child witness' testimony may be said to be techni-
cally given out-of-court (though we do not so hold)." Id.
201. Id. at 3166.
[Vol. 40:967
Televised Justice
the child witness is found to be competent, the child testifies under oath, the
defendant has an opportunity for cross-examination during the child's testi-
mony, and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view the child via a
video monitor.2 "2 The absence of any one of these elements, according to
the majority, does not destroy a defendant's sixth amendment right.
Justice O'Connor dispensed with the unavailability prong of Roberts, by
implicitly substituting a "necessary to further an important public policy"
standard.20 3 Justice O'Connor did not offer a rationale for doing so.2° She
simply argued that protecting the welfare of children is a sufficiently impor-
tant public policy.2" 5 The Court relied heavily on its earlier decision in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court2°6 to support its contention that the
Supreme Court has recognized and supported legislation to protect the well-
being of children in criminal trials.20 7 Justice O'Connor pointed out that a
majority of states have enacted child shield laws, which "attests to the wide-
spread belief" that shielding children is an important public policy.20 8 Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the Maryland statute, for example, reflects public
sentiment regarding the role of the state in guarding the well-being of chil-
dren. She concluded that the Court would not scrutinize the judgment of
the Maryland legislature, which recognized that protecting child abuse
victims from the emotional trauma of courtroom confrontation was a state
interest"° "sufficiently important to justify the use of a special
procedure.... 210
Justice O'Connor also stated that the Sixth Amendment requires trial
courts to make a finding of necessity before invoking the child shield proce-
dure, and the Maryland statute at issue comported with this requirement. 21'
The Craig majority stressed that protection from generalized courtroom
trauma is not sufficient to justify denial of face-to-face confrontation.212 In-
stead, the majority held that the trial court must demonstrate that the child
202. Id.
203. Id. at 3167-70. Cf. Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987). The
Wildermuth court and the Craig Court both evaluated "reliability" using the Ohio v. Roberts
test. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167; Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 514-16, 530 A.2d at 285. Only the
Wildermuth court used Roberts to evaluate necessity, requiring a finding of necessity which is
"tantamount to a finding of unavailability in the Roberts sense." Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286.
204. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167-70.
205. Id. at 3167.
206. 457 U.S. 596 (1982); supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
207. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
208. Id at 3167-68.
209. Id. at 3168-69.
210. Id. at 3169.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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witness would experience trauma in the physical presence of the defendant
and not merely from the pressure of testifying in court.' 3 In addition to
direct causation between the child's trauma and the presence of the defend-
ant, the trial court must be satisfied that the trauma is more than de
minimis.2'" Justice O'Connor found that the Maryland statutory provision,
requiring the trial court to find that the child witness would suffer "'serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate,'"
met the constitutional standard.215 She did not hold, however, that the
Maryland standard is the only, or the minimum standard. Indeed, Justice
O'Connor hinted that there may be other, less stringent standards that
would pass constitutional muster.
21 6
In addition, the majority required that the trial court hear evidence to
determine whether the use of the procedure is necessary to guard the welfare
of that particular child witness.21 7 Justice O'Connor declined to set federal
constitutional requirements for the quality of the evidence used by the trial
court in making its case specific findings of necessity.21 She refused to re-
quire the trial court to "explore less restrictive alternatives" or to "observe
the children's behavior in the defendant's presence 219 before invoking the
procedure. She did not disallow a trial court's reaching its conclusion rely-
ing solely on expert testimony.22°
With adequate safeguards of reliability 22' in place, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that providing testimony by one-way closed circuit television does
not undermine the truth enhancing or symbolic purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause.222 States may only use the procedure, however, after determin-
213. Id. This is the one issue upon which the Maryland Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court agreed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision in Craig because the
trial judge did not make a specific finding that it was the presence of the defendant that trig-
gered the child victim's trauma. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 566, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (1989),
vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). The Court of Appeals's other grounds for
reversal included reliance on expert testimony, the judge's failure to observe personally the
child victim in the presence of the defendant, and failure to attempt to use less restrictive
procedures. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
214. Id. at 3169. Justice O'Connor states that "more than 'mere nervousness or excitement
or some reluctance to testify'" must be present to justify use of the exception. Id (quoting
Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987)).
215. 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (quoting MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(l)(ii)).
216. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote: "We need not decide the minimum showing of emo-
tional trauma required for use of the special procedure .. " Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 3171.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 3166.
222. Id. at 3167.
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ing that it is necessary to further the state's interest "in protecting children
who are allegedly victims of child abuse from the trauma of testifying against
the alleged perpetrator." '223
B. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia,224 denounced the majority's failure
to "sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of
prevailing current opinion."22 The dissent first dismissed the majority's ra-
tionale that public support for the exception allowing child sex abuse victims
to avoid confrontation justifies its creation.22 6 The dissent argued that the
Constitution is meant to "protect against, rather than conform to" public
opinion.227
Next, Justice Scalia pointed out that the plain meaning of the Confronta-
tion Clause requires a face-to-face encounter,22 and that this encounter is
not a dispensable element of the confrontation right. 229 According to Justice
Scalia, the majority opinion, while claiming to maintain its purpose of ensur-
ing the reliability of evidence, eliminated the right of confrontation.23°
While Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause do exist, he argued that the precedents for dispensing with
direct physical confrontation stem from the necessity of accepting hearsay
evidence from declarants who are unavailable at trial.23' Therefore, the dis-
sent characterized the majority's newly minted exception to the Confronta-
tion Clause as "utterly unheard-of," because it allows a witness to appear at
trial and still not confront the accused. 232 Justice Scalia argued that face-to-
face confrontation of the accused by his accusers who testify at trial "is a
constitutional right unqualifiedly guaranteed," not a mere preference.233
According to the dissent, the majority eliminated the right to physical con-
frontation as a constitutional protection.
Justice Scalia recognized that the majority attempted to draw support
from traditional hearsay precedents to create an exception to the Confronta-
223. Id.
224. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined the dissent.
225. 110 U.S. at 3171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 3171-72.
227. Id. at 3172.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3173.
232. Id.
233. Id
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tion Clause that did not precisely "fit" into those traditional exceptions.2 34
He noted that, in general, exceptions to the Confrontation Clause hinge on a
finding of unavailability of the witness. 235 He also noted that other excep-
tions are allowed because the truth-bearing properties of the hearsay could
not be replicated at trial.2 36 Justice Scalia objected to the result in Craig
because it allowed a child to provide televised testimony who was not "un-
available" under Roberts.237 Justice Scalia argued that the standard in the
Maryland statute should be interpreted to mean that the trauma actually
makes it impossible for the child to communicate, 238 not the majority's
lesser standard of unable to communicate reasonably.23 9
While Justice Scalia acknowledged that convicting more child abusers is a
laudable goal, he argued that protecting "innocent defendants accused of
particularly heinous crimes" is equally worthy. 24° Justice Scalia noted stud-
ies indicating that children are more vulnerable to suggestion than adults
and less able to separate fantasy from reality.24 ' Therefore, Justice Scalia
argued that the guarantees of reliability are more important when children
testify because there is greater risk that children may not testify accu-
rately. 24 2 The requirement of face-to-face confrontation between the ac-
cused and his accuser is thus even more important as an additional means of
promoting the truth.24 a
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's assessment of the relative
interests of defendants and child witnesses does not comport with the text of
the Constitution. 2 1 While the Maryland procedure may be "virtually" con-
234. Id. at 3174.
235. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804 for hearsay statements that require that the declarant
be unavailable to testify, including former testimony. FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(1).
236. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3174. Justice Scalia cites the example of statements by a co-
conspirator, which can be admitted even if the declarant is available to testify because the
"effect cannot be replicated by live testimony" and their reliability is based on the circum-
stances under which they were originally uttered. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 3174 n.l.
239. Justice Scalia maintained that the new exception articulates an essentially pro-prose-
cution policy, because the defendant loses his right to physical confrontation only when that
physical confrontation would prevent a child witness from testifying against him. The excep-
tion allows prosecutors to call witnesses to testify who otherwise would not testify or who
could not be effective at trial. Id. at 3174-75.
240. Id. at 3175.
241. Id. (citations omitted).
242. Id. Justice Scalia cited the "tragic" Scott County, Minnesota, investigation as an ex-
ample of this "risk." Id. In that case, investigators charged 24 adults with abusing 37 chil-
dren. Twenty-five children were placed in foster homes. Ultimately, all but one of the accused
were found not guilty or had the charges dismissed. Id. (citing Feher, supra note 5, at 239-40).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 3176.
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stitutional in that it gives the defendant everything that is required except
physical confrontation, the dissent argued that it is not "actually" constitu-
tional because it deprives the defendant of the very right vested by the
Constitution.245
IV. MARYLAND V. CRAIG: GUIDANCE TO THE STATES, BUT WITH
POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
Maryland v. Craig2 generally upholds the validity of state laws that per-
mit the use of televised testimony in child abuse cases where there is a legis-
latively or judicially imposed requirement of a particularized finding of
necessity.24 In addition, under Craig, a trial court must specifically find
that it is the presence of the defendant that triggers such trauma that the
child is unable to communicate reasonably. 248 Limited to its facts, Craig
approves the use of one-way closed circuit television in child sex abuse pros-
ecutions.249 It is almost certain that Craig will be read to apply to all tele-
vised testimony in child abuse cases.25 °
The Craig decision will have the least impact on the "strict" state laws25'
because these laws already embody the basic requirements of Craig.252 For
example, Maryland's necessity requirement, that the trauma of facing the
defendant will render a child unable to communicate reasonably, meets the
criteria articulated in Craig.253 A number of state courts already mandate a
standard similar to the one approved in Craig.254 Moreover, because the
245. Id.
246. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
247. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 137
(1990) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
248. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
249. Id. at 3171.
250. The majority opinion does not distinguish between state statutes allowing videotaping
and those allowing closed circuit television. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167. The Court's treatment
of these two types of statutes indicates that the Court views these two methods as serving the
same function and as engendering the same constitutional questions. Id. Similarly, state
courts also view these different "shield" procedures as raising identical constitutional ques-
tions, as evidenced by their response to Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). See supra notes
156-62 and accompanying text. The Coy case involved the use of a one-way screen to block the
witnesses' view of the defendant in open court; yet the rule was applied equally to statutes
allowing the use of closed circuit television as well as to those allowing the use of videotaped
testimony.
251. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-102 (1984 & Supp. 1986); State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1061 (1988); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
252. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. Craig may also have an impact on the
few states that view videotaped and closed circuit television as hearsay and allow such testi-
Catholic University Law Review
Craig Court did not suggest the level of necessity as the minimum or the sole
standard; it left open the possibility that other criteria might be acceptable
for measuring an exception to the right to physical confrontation.255 For
example, Connecticut's Jarzbek 25 6 test, allowing televised testimony when
confronting the accused would undermine the child witness's truthfulness,
may well pass constitutional muster, because the standard requires an indi-
vidualized finding of need and furthers the Confrontation Clause's goal of
enhancing the truth.257 A bare statutory standard which allows a child vic-
tim to avoid physical confrontation if such an encounter would impair the
emotional and psychological well-being of the child witness258 or cause
trauma to the child,259 however, may not be sustained under a strict reading
of Craig because these standards do not protect the truthseeking goals of the
Confrontation Clause.2 " Mirroring the states's response to Coy, 2 6' state
courts will likely find that child shield laws pass constitutional muster if
their application is limited to those specific situations where the presence of
the defendant will have an effect on the child which is roughly equivalent to
the Craig standard of inability to communicate reasonably.262
The requirement that the trial judge must find that it is the presence of the
defendant which traumatizes the child, not simply the prospect of testifying
in open court, will probably be the part of the Craig decision that will re-
strict state courts the most. Few state supreme courts have scrutinized the
mony under the state exception to the hearsay rules. The United States Supreme Court has
distinguished exceptions to the hearsay rule from exceptions to the right to face-to-face con-
frontation in child sex abuse prosecutions. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990) (find-
ing that statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule will withstand constitutional challenge only if
declarant is unavailable and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are present). Excep-
tions to the hearsay rule that are not deeply rooted are still analyzed using the Roberts test,
which requires a showing of unavailability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). The
effect of Craig on these laws is unclear; they may meet and exceed the Craig standard of
availability. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1989) (requiring the trial judge
to find that the child is unavailable or disqualified, that the child's statements appear to be
reliable, and that the child was not induced or coerced to make the statements before admit-
ting hearsay statements). On the other hand, the use of televised testimony is classified as an
exception to the hearsay rule, a classification the Craig Court implicitly rejected. Craig, 110 S.
Ct. at 3167.
255. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
256. State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061
(1988).
257. Id. at 703-04, 529 A.2d at 1255.
258. See, e.g., State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1987); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353
S.E.2d 451 (1987).
259. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 229 N.J. Super. 66, 74-75, 550 A.2d 1241, 1245 (1988); see
also supra note 64.
260. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164 (1990).
261. See supra notes 153-59, 162 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
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child shield statutes this closely; rather, they simply gloss over the distinc-
tion between courtroom-induced trauma and defendant-induced trauma.263
In addition, the Craig decision deliberately gives little guidance on the type
of evidence needed to support this finding of necessity.26 Clearly, the taking
of televised testimony must be supported by some evidence265 and the evi-
dence must support a finding that the child will be traumatized by the de-
fendant's presence.266 The requirement for hearing evidence means that a
trial judge cannot rely solely on his own observations in allowing the use of
televised testimony.267 In practice, the requirement that a judge issue find-
ings will undoubtedly lead to an additional pre-trial procedure to determine
the necessity of televised testimony. 268 The absence of such a finding may
result in reversals or remands of previously valid convictions to determine if
the finding of necessity can be sustained in light of Craig.269
Part of the difficulty with the Craig opinion may be that it is driven by
public opinion 2 ° rather than a straightforward legal analysis of a constitu-
tional right. It appears that the Court sought to find an exception to the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause that would enable evidence to be
proffered against sex abuse defendants while protecting the alleged victims
from courtroom trauma. Yet, no exception existed and none could be easily
extrapolated from current law. Thus, it seems that public policy concerns
may have motivated the Craig majority to reject the Roberts test of neces-
sity-unavailability.
The Roberts approach is more conservative than that of Craig and does
not necessitate as great a departure from precedent. 2 1 Reasoning that the
263. See Leading Cases, supra note 247, at 137 n.70.
264. The Craig Court declined "to establish, as a matter of federal constitutional law, any
such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the one-way television procedure."
Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3171. This lack of guidance as to the minimum standards "will likely
encourage lower courts to uphold" child shield procedures "despite lower necessity thresholds
than that of the Maryland statute." Leading Cases, supra note 247, at 137.
265. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
266. Id. at 3171; see also Lang, supra note 175, at 368 (stating that under Craig "a trial
court may invoke a special procedure only after it has received evidence and made a case-
specific finding" of necessity).
267. See Lang, supra note 175, at 368.
268. Id. at 369-70.
269. See, e.g., Leggett v. State, 565 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1990) (reversing post-Craig deci-
sion because trial judge failed to make findings of fact that child would suffer moderate mental
or psychological harm).
270. One observer has noted that the media attention focused on child sexual abuse "has
kindled a public outcry for greater protection of children." Feher, supra note 5, at 228. The
extreme public response, however, is "startlingly reminiscent of the Salem witch hunts and
McCarthy's 'Red Scare.'" Id. at 228-29.
271. See generally Randall L. Hagen, Comment, Maryland's Child Abuse Testimony Stat-
ute: Is Protecting the Child Witness Constitutional?, 49 MD. L. REV. 463 (1990). In this pre-
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trauma induced by testifying in the presence of the defendant renders a child
unavailable under Roberts, a few state courts have adopted the Roberts
test.272 The Craig Court did not choose this approach perhaps because the
Roberts requirement of unavailability applies equally to all witnesses and
does not necessarily make it easier for children, as opposed to other classes
of witnesses, to avoid facing the accused.2 73 The Craig majority wanted the
child witness to be able both to testify and to avoid physical confrontation
without demonstrating unavailability; 274 therefore, the Court created a
lower level of "necessity," called "unable to reasonably communicate," and
made it applicable only to child witnesses.27 5
Advocates of criminal defendants's rights might view the Craig require-
ments as granting sex abuse defendants at least some protection from being
automatically stripped of the right to physically confront their accusers.
The Craig decision, however, may eventually weaken a criminal defendant's
ability to claim this same right. The Craig standard is vague and the Court
chose to leave it to the state courts to decide proof requirements.276 Relying
on expert testimony or the testimony of lay witnesses, usually a parent or
guardian, the trial court will be called upon to predict how the child would
behave if called to testify.2 77  While merely ineffective testimony should not
qualify the child to present televised testimony under the Craig standard, the
line between being unable to communicate reasonably and providing ineffec-
tive testimony is not clear.2 71 It is almost certain that prosecutors will at-
Craig commentary, the author suggests that shielded child testimony could be constitutionally
admitted if it passed the Roberts test of unavailability and reliability, thus fitting within estab-
lished rules for Confrontation Clause exceptions. Id at 483.
272. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
273. See Leading Cases, supra note 247, at 136. The decision must be understood "as an
example of the Court's increasing willingness to interpret the Bill of Rights differently when
children are concerned." Id.; see also Paula S. Coons, Note, The Revision of Article 38.071
After Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 267,
281 n.88 (1988) (stating unavailability under Roberts implies that confrontation must happen
in all cases unless it is not possible). Id.
274. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169-70 (1990).
275. Id.
276. Id at 3171.
277. The Craig Court does not require that the child attempt and fail to "reasonably com-
municate" before allowing the use of televised testimony. Id. at 3176. Instead, the court will
rely on experts whose "ability ... to make such predictions accurately is unknown." Lang,
supra note 175, at 369.
278. One of the prosecution's main concerns is not simply preventing harm to the child,
but whether the child will make a credible witness if forced to testify in the presence of the
defendant. See Owen, supra note 10, at 1513 n.12 (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief for American
Bar Association at 9-10, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757)). The brief stated:
Testifying in sight of the defendant may ... weaken the state's case. The trauma
may contribute to the child "freezing" on the witness stand, fidgeting, stammering,
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tempt to invoke the statute whenever the presence of the defendant renders a
child's testimony "ineffective," thus pushing trial courts to construe Craig
liberally on behalf of child witnesses. Used in this way, the exception be-
comes a prosecutorial sword which may put many innocent defendants be-
hind bars.27 9
While this exception is presently limited to child sex abuse victims, the
Craig rationale can be extended to a broader class of witnesses. It is difficult
to distinguish logically between children and other classes of people who
may have special needs.180 The Craig Court did not address the age of the
child victim, leaving it to the states to decide the maximum age at which
public policy may require the use of a child shield procedure. Some state
laws allow "children" as old as seventeen the benefit of these protective stat-
utes.2"' The powers of memory and degree of impressionability of a sixteen-
year-old rape victim and an eighteen-year-old rape victim differ little,28 2 yet
in some states the sixteen-year-old will be protected while the eighteen-year-
old will not be protected. Certainly, both may be equally traumatized.28 3
The narrow reading of Craig is that a child sex abuse victim may avoid
physical confrontation of the accused if the trial court finds that the child
will be so traumatized by facing the defendant that he will be unable to
communicate reasonably. But the broader reading of Craig is that when it is
necessary to further an important public policy, a court may order the tak-
ing of televised testimony out of the presence of the defendant upon making
a finding of particularized need.
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland v. Craig allows child sex abuse victims to testify without physi-
cally confronting their alleged abusers if such a confrontation would render
them unable to reasonably communicate. The constitutionality of this pro-
cedure is established by creating a new exception to the right to confronta-
and in general casting false doubt upon his or her credibility and veracity. If the
child is unable to testify effectively, the case may be dismissed.
Id. (emphasis added) (omission in original).
279. One observer has noted that in divorce or custody battles "the initial allegation may
either be made by the parent or by the child as coached or conditioned by the parent." Feher,
supra note 5, at 235.
280. Elderly or developmentally disabled persons, for example, may have special vulnera-
bilities and yet may be found competent to testify. Lang, supra note 175, at 367.
281. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989).
282. Differences between adult and child memory capacity dwindle as children age. See,
e.g., Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the
Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 185-86, 189, 191 (1985).
283. "[R]ape victims suffer severe emotional distress or trauma while testifying, especially
when face-to-face with the accused." Graham, supra note 48, at 560.
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tion under the Sixth Amendment. For the first time, an available witnesses
may testify in court and avoid facing the accused.
Craig puts some much needed restraints on states' use of child shield stat-
utes. By imposing such restraints, the United States Supreme Court begins
to offer the barest outlines of federal guidance. Craig, however, stops short
and leaves many important questions unanswered for yet another day. In
the meantime, the Craig Court, in the name of protecting children, has
planted seeds that could have a profound impact on the nature of trials as we
know them today.
Theresa Cusick
